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The objective of this paper is to outline steps that the Obama Administration 
could take to help pass legislation for an innovative funding mechanism known as a 
National Infrastructure Bank (NIB). The recommended steps are based on a historical 
account of the leadership provided by Presidents Roosevelt and Eisenhower when 
passing the original bills that authorized the Interstate system. Key policy 
recommendations include: framing the need for an NIB as a means of economic growth 
and natural disaster resilience, building strategic stakeholder support through education, 
and engaging and compromising with Congress while developing the NIB proposal. If 
successfully applied, these lessons can help enable the creation of an NIB that would 
increase infrastructure investment by billions of dollars while rehabilitating the struggling 










It has been rumored that the United States Interstate Highway System began with 
President Roosevelt drawing three lines North to South and three lines East to West on a 
map of the U.S. and asking the Bureau of Public Roads to make it a reality [1]. The 
validity of this “simple” beginning of the Interstate Highway System has not been 
confirmed, but it is clear that the Interstate system that has connected our nation for more 
than 50 years has not come without hard work, diligent planning, and strong political 
leadership. President Dwight D. Eisenhower captured the magnitude of this undertaking 
when estimating, “The amount of concrete poured to form these roadways would build 
eighty Hoover Dams or six sidewalks to the moon. To build them, bulldozers and shovels 
would move enough dirt and rock to bury all of Connecticut two feet deep” [2]. The 
construction of a national highway system has provided a foundation upon which five 
decades of economic growth and prosperity have rested. 
Despite the solid foundation laid by President Eisenhower, lack of adequate 
investment and maintenance has left the Nation’s transportation system in a less than 
impressive global standing. According to the World Economic Forum, the U.S. 
infrastructure network fell from being ranked ninth in 2008 to 25
th
 in 2012 [3]. Continued 
declines in global competitiveness are expected as infrastructure spending continues to 
fall short of national needs as physical asset deterioration accelerates. National 
associations, like the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), share the sentiment 
of declining infrastructure quality with associated declines in economic competiveness. 
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ASCE completed a comprehensive review of the U.S. infrastructure system looking at 
each category of infrastructure with three assets falling directly in the realm of surface 
transportation: bridges, roads, and transit. These three assets were estimated to have a 
$1.2 trillion spending shortfall over the next five years and given letter grades of C, D-, 
and D, respectively [4]. The World Economic Forum rankings and ASCE grades paint a 
clear picture of the current status and impending direction of the U.S. transportation 
system if serious measures are taken to redirect the existing path. 
The factors leading the U.S. transportation system to its current state are many, 
but an undeniable central reason is lack of investment. Each year America invests two 
percent of its GDP on infrastructure, a value roughly half the percentage of 50 years ago. 
Furthermore, this proportion is dwarfed by European countries, which invest on average 
five percent of their GDP each year in infrastructure and China with an even greater nine 
percent [5]. Though statistical indicators point to the need for increased investment in 
infrastructure, the current political and economic climate of the United States has made it 
difficult to pass decisive legislation for this purpose. However, there is a promising and 
novel proposal that has been put forth to create a National Infrastructure Bank (NIB) to 
assist in providing more funding for infrastructure projects through long-term loan 
mechanisms that can be leveraged with private sector investment.  
This paper applies a historical lens to the Presidential leadership employed when 
developing the Eisenhower Highway System to find lessons that can be applied to 
creating a National Infrastructure Bank. First, the history of roads in America will be 
reviewed concisely to provide insight on the political environment that Presidents 
Roosevelt and Eisenhower maneuvered in while advocating for the highway system. The 
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focus will then fast forward to more recent years to identify causes of the diminished 
quality of the U.S. transportation network. Finally, the concept of a NIB will be presented 
and policy lessons from President Roosevelt and Eisenhower will be applied to outline 
steps that President Obama could take to bring an NIB to fruition. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EARLY STEPS IN CONNECTING A NATION 
 
Though President Dwight Eisenhower is credited with signing the 1956 Federal-
Aid Highway Act that catalyzed the building of over 40,000 miles of U.S. Interstate 
highway, the process of building a system to carry goods and people across our vast 
country began decades before. The discussion on the importance of roads in America and 
who should bear the costs for building and maintaining them has been debated since the 
18
th
 century and the answer to this disputed question has shifted a number of times 
between the government and the private sector. Understanding this history and realizing 
that multiple types of financing mechanisms for transportation infrastructure have 
prevailed over time is critical for realizing the political atmosphere and contrasting 
ideology present during the Roosevelt and Eisenhower administrations. 
Private Roads in the Beginning 
The first “organized” American road occurred in 1795 with the chartering of the 
Fairfax and Loudoun Turnpike Road Company in the state of Virginia [6]. Roads during 
this period were built for transportation like the roads of present, but were constructed 
using very different methods and for the purpose of horse carriage. Each traveler paid a 
user-fee of just a few cents to traverse the roads. The company that constructed the road 
would collect tolls to recoup their initial construction costs and profit. States provided 
subsidies through tax exemptions to companies constructing roads due to the public good, 
but all the capital and investment risk of building these roads fell on the private sector. 
Typical return on investment for companies constructing successful road projects during 
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this period hovered between a modest 12-15 percent. However, few of the toll roads 
constructed made consistent profits to yield a positive ROI making them risky and often 
poor investments [7]. This structure of the private sector financing the capital and bearing 
the risk would be the conventional means of road construction for decades to follow.  
Public Roads Deemed Unconstitutional 
At the turn of the 19
th
 century, the U.S. began expand and looked to grow the 
nation’s population into new frontiers. During this period, a new ideological approach to 
road financing began that continues to shape road financing even today. In 1803, the 
federal government became involved with financing the country’s transportation system. 
In an effort to motivate citizens to leave the eastern cities of the United States, Congress 
established a dedicated funding stream for road construction in the state of Ohio. Through 
this legislation, two percent of the revenue from the sales of public lands in the newly 
founded state of Ohio would be dedicated to the building of public roads. Congress 
believed that the construction of non-toll roads across the state would spur further 
development and bring new settlers. In 1806, Congress went further and passed 
legislation that would allocate $30,000 to the construction of a “National Road” to run 
from Maryland to the Ohio River [6]. Having already dedicated funding to transportation 
in a single state and allocating funds for an individual project, the question rose in 1807 
as to whether the government should take the next step and invest in financing roads and 
canals to connect the nation. This culminated in a report that was submitted to Congress 
outlining a series of road, canal, and river improvements that could be executed across 
the country. Congress rejected this report, and more broadly the concept of funding 
transportation infrastructure, on “constitutional, budgetary, and sectional benefit 
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grounds.” This sentiment was shared by Presidents Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Tyler, 
Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan, who all vetoed transportation bills funded by the federal 
government deeming the act unconstitutional [8]. With this precedent set and the rise of 
the railroad for transport, road construction would see a period of slow growth until the 
turn of the century.  
The Good Roads Movement 
The year 1890 would mark a renewed spirit of road building in America with the 
Good Roads Movement. This movement would be monumental in the establishment of 
the nation’s first federal road agency in 1893 – the Office of Road Inquiry (ORI) [9]. 
With the ORI in place and momentum building through the movement, the start of the 
20
th
 century was prime for the advancement of roads in America. This time coincided 
with another federal innovation known as the Rural Free Delivery (RFD), the expansion 
of the postal delivery system to rural areas that were not previously served. The only 
caveat to this service was homes were required to have roads that could be traveled by the 
postal delivery personnel. The opportunity to receive mail at their homes was enough to 
bring the support of many rural Americans. With widespread public support, Congress 
passed legislation that would provide $20 million for roads to be used for mail delivery. 
Disbursed on the county level, this program allowed for up to $500,000 in federal funds 
for counties that were willing to match the financing. However, the program quickly 
became overly complicated, as the federal government was required to work directly with 
the more than 1,000 rural counties falling under the program’s jurisdiction [9]. Despite 
complications, this initiative overcame the previous mindset that federal funding for 
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roads was unconstitutional and set the precedent of 50-50 matching federal funds for 
public roads. 
Precedent for Federal Road Funding 
The next major step in transportation policy came in 1916. The Federal Highway 
Act of 1916 was passed during a time period of huge growth in car ownership. The Act 
provided $75 million over five years and continued the legacy of a 50-50 federal match 
[9]. Utilizing lessons from the Rural Free Delivery program, all disbursements were done 
at the state level allowing state agencies to make funding decisions and making the 
process less complicated at the federal level. Though the Act applied lessons learned 
from the past, it would be deemed a failure since little road building would come out of 
the legislation due to the start of World War I. 
One final critical moment in U.S. transportation history came prior to President 
Roosevelt taking office. Taxation would be the focus and it would come in the form of 
the Federal Revenue Act of 1932. This Act marked the first time that a federal gas tax 
would be enacted allowing for one cent per gallon to be collected by the government. 
After over a century of ideological shifts on how roads should be financed, the 1932 Act 
would finally lay a foundation for the future. Though the revenue from this tax was not 
earmarked for transportation, it opened the door for the taxation of fuel – a tradition that 
continues today. The creation of this tax and the use of federal funds for roads was not a 
proposition that was warmly accepted by everyone. Many people did not agree with 
taxing gasoline and companies selling the product worried that the tax would cut into 
their own profit by reducing demand by raising the price. Figure 1 shows a political 
cartoon that was created alluding to the taxation of gasoline and the concerns that the gas 
 8 
tax revenue was greater than the amount that would be put towards the construction of 
roads. This was concern was valid. However, since gas tax funds were not earmarked into 
a separate account specifically for transportation, funds from tax revenue were intended 
for the general fund as a revenue raising measure. 
 
Figure 1 – Political cartoon depicting sentiments toward the use of the 1 cent gas tax [1] 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROGRESS UNDER PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 
 
The present-day Interstate highway system began to take shape under the 
Roosevelt administration. President Roosevelt took office during a tumultuous economic 
time period for the country. Faced with the Great Depression and a country with record 
levels of unemployment, President Roosevelt put forth his New Deal program to 
rehabilitate a hurting nation. During his tenure, Roosevelt passed four major highway 
bills that would progress highway investment as a means of job creation and economic 
growth. Although the legislation for the Interstate system was executed under 
Eisenhower, it can be argued that Roosevelt planned it. 
Critical Early Legislation 
Roosevelt’s first piece of transportation legislation was the Federal Highway Act 
of 1934 also known as the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934. Highway planning was 
birthed through this Act because it allowed for up to 1.5 percent of federal matching 
funds for highway surveys, plans, and engineering investigation [10]. The process of 
creating a highway inventory and planning future projects became a major undertaking 
and steady source of employment. It was said that during this time for every one person 
employed in roadwork there were two more employed in manufacturing and 
transportation of road materials and equipment [2].  Prior to this act, all costs related to 
planning roadway projects had to be paid by the state. During this period of financial 
struggle for the nation, and especially at the state level, this provision helped 
tremendously and allowed states to put a greater focus on designing their transportation 
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future. The Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934 can be seen in the present day with federal 
funding provided for studies to plan future projects and a large amount of resources being 
provided for highway and transportation research. The Transportation Research Board, 
the major public transportation research entity, provides millions in federally funded 
grants each year for research projects throughout the country that focus on enabling 
innovation in the transportation sector.  
Hayden-Cartwright is also noteworthy for its emergency road funding, urban road 
funding, and earmarking provisions. The act provided 100 percent funding for the repair 
of Federal Aid highway system roads in the event of a natural disaster. This act marked 
the first time legislation specifically focused on natural disasters’ impact on roads and 
provided federal level funding for any damages. Additionally, Hayden-Cartwright 
allowed federal funding to go towards road construction through urban areas. The debate 
on whether the government should fund roads through urban cities was settled for the 
short-term through this act. Roads through urban areas were more expensive and had far 
less impact on interstate travel than rural roads. Until this moment, federally funded road 
construction had been primarily focused on rural roads. The inclusion of urban areas for 
federal funding ensured the utility of cars and freeways for all Americans. Though the 
debate on whether cities should be included in the federal highway system would 
continue for decades to follow, the ultimate decision aligned with the direction of 
Hayden-Cartwright. Finally, the 1934 Act required states to dedicate state gas tax revenue 
to the purpose of road building. Prior to this law, states were able to use gas tax as 
general revenue to put toward funding initiatives of their choice. Passing Hayden-
Cartwright ensured that states would be dedicating a substantial amount of funds to roads 
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each year. However, the law was quite contradictory to federal taxation practices because 
federal gas tax revenue was not dedicated strictly to road construction at the time. 
Instead, gas tax was deposited into the general fund and was not directly connected to 
federal highway expenditures. It would take18 years for the federal government to build a 
funding structure that would require investment of gas tax dollars to transportation. 
The second bill passed under Roosevelt was the Federal Highway Act of 1938, 
which laid the foundation for the Interstate system passed under Eisenhower. As a part of 
the 1938 legislation, the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), formally known as the ORI, 
began a study on six superhighways that would traverse the country [2].  These six 
highways would be funded through toll collection and would consist of three highways 
running North to South and three East to West. In 1939, the study culminated in a Toll 
Roads versus Free Roads report that made critical findings available. The report 
described a high performance system that would consist of one percent of the nation’s 
total roads but carry 20 percent of the traffic. These numbers were spot on for the final 
system built decades later with 1.2 percent of the nation’s roads carrying 21 percent of 
the traffic. Furthermore, the report investigated five system alternatives arriving at an 
optimal design with 33,920 miles of highway connecting all American cities containing 
populations over 300,000. Finally and most critically, the report concluded that the 
highway system could not be self-sustaining if financed via tolls. Less than 200 miles of 
the system were estimated to generate enough tolls to cover their own construction costs 
and only 1/5
th




Planning the Nation’s Highway Future 
The plans from the 1939 Toll Roads versus Free Roads report laid untouched for 
two years until 1941 when Roosevelt appointed an Interregional Highway Committee to 
resume progress [2]. The committee worked on planning the nation’s highway system, 
but the pending war in Europe halted any dedicated funds toward executing any plans. 
Growing concerns of war culminated at the end of 1941 with the Defense Highway Act 
of 1941. This Act authorized 100 percent of federal-aid for right-of-way costs for roads 
accessing plants and 75 percent funding for acquiring lands for a strategic defense 
network [11]. Just three weeks after this Act was passed, Pearl Harbor was attacked and 
the United States entered World War II shifting all resources to the war effort. 
Roosevelt’s final transportation legislation was the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1944. The Act allocated $1.5 billion over a three-year period after the conclusion of the 
war effort. It was Roosevelt’s objective to ensure that funds would be present for states to 
proactively utilize as soon as the war effort ended. Roosevelt stated that, “Adequate 
facilities for highway communication will be essential in the future as a part of an 
expanding, prosperous economy that will insure jobs. They will be essential also to the 
national defense, as well as to the safe and efficient transportation service which belong 
to America's way of living” [11]. After realizing that tolls would not work, Roosevelt’s 
mechanism for funding these interstate facilities was known as excessive condemnation. 
Through this method, the government would acquire right-of-way far larger than the 
highway limits at a low cost. After the construction of the highways the government 
would be able to sell the lands and capture the property value appreciation from the 
newly constructed infrastructure.  
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During Roosevelt’s presidency there was not much physical progress made in the 
construction of the Interstate system but his policy and planning contributions were 
invaluable. Most of the system that would be executed more than a decade later was 
planned in the Bureau of Public Roads during Roosevelt’s tenure, the economic 
justification of federally funded roads versus toll roads was clarified, and for the first 
time the importance of a national highway system for defense purposes was recognized at 
the presidential level and used to justify transportation policy. 
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CHAPTER 4  
EISENHOWER SEALS THE DEAL 
 
As with Roosevelt, President Eisenhower began his administration at a pivotal 
time for the nation. The first year of his presidency, 1953, marked the close of the Korean 
War and the second time in ten years that the nation had come home from war. With no 
war effort to boost employment and foster economic activity, Eisenhower began to 
develop a plan that would concentrate on domestic growth and defense after many years 
of investing money and energy into wars abroad.  
Eisenhower’s experience as a general during World War II exposed him to 
Germany and its autobahn highway system. The German autobahn impressed the General 
in both its utility and durability making him realize, “the wisdom of broader ribbons 
across the land. Bombing can immobilize a rail system quite easily, but the autobahn was 
much harder to destroy” [9]. This experience was a stark contrast to his 1919 expedition 
across America while a Lieutenant Colonel in the army. This trip took over two months 
to travel 3,250 miles with an average travel speed of just five miles per hour [9]. After the 
impression left on him by the German highways and the sour taste from his journey 
across the U.S., Eisenhower wasted no time in pushing for the construction of a national 
highway system to connect the nation. 
A Short-term Highway Solution 
The Federal Highway Act of 1954 was the first measure taken by Eisenhower to 
accelerate the nation’s highway program. This bill appropriated $175 million per year to 
highway construction for the years 1956 and 1957 and dwarfed the $25 million allocated 
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in the preceding 1952 Act. Eisenhower’s 1954 Act also increased the share of costs 
covered by the federal government from 50 percent to 60 percent [2]. However, 
increasing appropriations to the highway system was not Eisenhower’s main objective. 
He was more focused on an overhaul of the program and the construction of the largest 
public works project in the history of the country.  
Passing the Federal Interstate Highway Act of 1956 
President Eisenhower’s first public step in introducing his vision and garnering 
support for the Interstate highway system was taken on July 12, 1954. This step came in 
the form of an address to the Governors’ Conference at Lake George. President 
Eisenhower was unable to be present due to the death of his sister-in-law, so Vice 
President Richard Nixon delivered the speech Eisenhower prepared [12]. Governors from 
each state attended this conference – an audience deemed critical by Eisenhower to have 
in support of his venture. The economic advantages that an Interstate system would bring 
to each state were used to gain the praises of the Governors and Eisenhower challenged 
those backing the concept to develop ideas that could make the plan a reality. To focus on 
internal matters concerning the highway system, Eisenhower appointed General Lucius 
Clay to lead an advisory committee on the national highway system, coined “The Clay 
Committee.” By the end of 1954, the Clay Committee had developed a 10-year $27 
billion plan for the creation of a national Interstate highway system that would have the 
federal government covering 90 percent of the costs [1].  
 At the start of 1955 the Clay Committee brought forth their proposal for the 
highway system to Congress. It was also during this year that the name was officially 
changed to the National Highway and Defense System to address the multiple purposes 
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of this undertaking and corral the support of southern Congressmen that were more likely 
to support military related spending. This designation made it clear that the rationale of 
creating this system was more robust than just interstate commerce and travel. Though 
the plan garnered bipartisan support, financing was a major issue of contention. The Clay 
Committee proposed a 32-year bond-financing program that would be funded through a 
2-cent gas tax. A Federal Highway Corporation would be developed to take on the 
liability of the bonds and operate as its own entity. This financing alternative met wide 
opposition due to the following constraints of the plan: (1) over the 32-year bond 
repayment period the debt would accrue $11.5 billion in interest – equivalent to 55 
percent of the bond, (2) Congress would not have appropriation control over the funds 
since they would be handled by the Federal Highway Corporation, (3) the federal gas tax 
would be controlled at 2-cents for the next 32 years meaning that this Congress would be 
obligating subsequent congresses to upholding this tax [1]. These objections caused the 
bill to not be passed in 1955 with a vote in the House of 193-221 and Senate of 31-60, 
despite President Eisenhower’s strong support [2].  
 The failing of the Clay Committee bill would not be the end of the highway 
discussion, as two more bills would be developed by members of Congress: Senator 
Albert Gore and Representative George Fallon. Gore’s bill did not directly address the 
issue of financing while Fallon’s bill stated that the financing source would be an 
increased gas tax that could cover the fees as people used the system. Support for these 
bills and even the Clay bill was present in Congress but much external opposition was 
faced from lobbying organizations American Automobile Association (AAA), state 
highway officials, tire companies, some state governors, and the petroleum industry. 
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These groups believed the increased gas tax would have a negative effect on their 
interests. It was said that, “From the day of introduction of [the Fallon bill,] there 
occurred one of the most intense pressure campaigns observed on Capitol Hill for many 
years… This campaign moved with increasing intensity until the revised tax bill was 
defeated on the floor of the House” [2]. The year 1955 came to a close with three bills 
proposed and all three left on the table. President Eisenhower wrote a letter to Congress 
stating that he was disappointed that no legislation could be passed in that year’s session 
and urged them to yield to the financing method from the Fallon proposal. This letter 
stated four major reasons why it was necessary to pass this legislation: (1) 36,000 annual 
deaths on the system each year that equate to $4.3 billion in economic loses, (2) an 
additional $5 billion in economic losses from the nation because of a poor road system, 
(3) the criticality of roads in case of a nuclear attack, and (4) that congestion was bad 
right now but was only a taste of what would be seen in the years to follow if nothing was 
done [13]. Eisenhower’s willingness to compromise on the financing aspect of the bill 
was shown through this letter since he was in favor of self-financing toll roads not user-
taxes. The passing of this bill was imperative to Eisenhower and the funding source was 
something that could be solidified once the program was approved. 
 At the start of 1956, Congress returned to work on a bill to construct and finance 
the National Interstate Highway and Defense System. It would be Fallon again who 
would develop a solution. Fallon’s bill put forth a 13-year $24.8 billion plan 
encompassing 41,000 miles of interstate highways. This plan would be funded through 
user-fees from a gas tax increase to three cents and rubber tax that would both be 
earmarked for the transportation [13]. After the 1955 defeats, lobbying by pro-highway 
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advocates increased and for unknown reasons few anti-highway lobbyists were active. 
With a financing solution that Congress believed to be sustainable and the majority of 
lobbying voices now in support of the bill, the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act was 
officially passed in June of 1956 with a margin of 388-19 in the House and a voice vote 
in the Senate [2]. The passing of this act was only made possible through the passing of a 
parallel act – the Highway Revenue Act of 1956. This act ensured that all money raised 
through federal gas and rubber taxes would be deposited into the Highway Trust Fund 




DECLINING QUALITY AND A CHANGING U.S. LANDSCAPE 
 
Since the conception of the U.S. Interstate Highway System, estimating the costs 
of construction and maintenance of transportation infrastructure has been a struggle. Just 
5 years after passing the 1956 Highway Act, Congress realized that the original estimates 
of construction costs were more than $12 billion short of the necessary funding level and 
had to increase the amount from $25 billion to $37.6 billion (not accounting for 
inflation). This funding increase would be coupled with a gas tax increase from 3 cents to 
4 cents [2]. The system was expanded from the original 41,000 miles to 42,500 miles 
through the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. The decades to follow would mark a 
period of massive highway construction and an overgrowing HTF. This expansion and 
growth would continue until the year of 1992 when the U.S. Interstate System was 
deemed complete. Original estimates for the system suggested less than $25 billion in 
costs and 13 years to construct. In reality, the system cost $128 billion and took 36 years 
[14]. The increased time and costs can be attributed to the rise of environmental, the 
urban highway revolt from growing public opposition of more highways, and increasing 
construction costs from both regulations and inflation. 
Shifting Beyond Highway Construction 
Though constructing the highway system is often the focus of attention, a major 
and critical shift came in the 1980s that continues to today. As thousands of miles were 
completed and utilized by the millions of American enjoying a newfound ability to drive 
on limited-access high-speed freeways, the Federal Highway Administration began to 
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focus on the maintenance of the system. The heavy use of highways brought rapid 
deterioration to the assets and the FHWA was required to develop policies and plans to 
preserve the nation’s large investment. Since the cost of maintenance was not accurately 
quantified from the start of the system, there has long been a limited amount of funds 
available to repair an overwhelming amount of deteriorating assets.  
Further amplifying the funding shortfall faced by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation is the revenue structure for collecting funds. The same mechanism has 
been used for highway funding since the start of the 1956 highway program. The use of 
earmarked gas tax funds was an innovative and viable solution when it was decided upon 
in the 1950s, but is no longer fitting as forms of transportation evolve. The use of a gas 
tax has become a less efficient means of collecting transportation revenue with the 
emergence of other forms of transportation that also utilize tax revenues – mass transit, 
pedestrian infrastructure, and bicycle infrastructure. Spending gas tax dollars collected 
from vehicles on mass transit has been a long debated issue since the creation of a Mass 
Transit account April 1, 1983 [15]. The HTF was a funding source created to finance the 
construction of a defined system; yet we have continued to use this source long beyond 
its defined life and even diverted many of the funds to cover items that were outside of 
the original scope. The time has come to re-evaluate this practice to ensure financial 
stability for the future of the Nation’s infrastructure system. 
The Gas Tax Problem 
When the HTF was created in 1956 the gas tax was three cents per gallon. This 
gas tax has increased five times since then to its current level set in 1993 of 18.4 cents per 
gallon [14]. These increases were enacted for the purpose of covering increased costs 
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related to the system and the expansion of the HTF to include mass transit projects. 
However, since 1993 the gas tax has stayed at the same amount since the amount set at 
that time was at an absolute amount and did not take into account inflation over time. In 
more recent years, specifically since the onset of the recession in 2007, vehicle travel has 
leveled off and even seen a period of reduced travel. More fuel-efficient cars combined 
with less travel have resulted in less gas purchases and consequently less revenue for the 
HTF despite increased funding demands by state DOTs. This outlook becomes even less 
promising as electric and hybrid cars gain greater market share and appear to be a fixture 
for the future. There has been a lack of political willpower to increase the gas tax to 
account for these issues or transition our nation to a more stable vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) charge system that charges users by the mile instead of the gallon. This tax-
collection issue is a fundamental problem that will continue to accelerate the HTF’s 
trajectory towards insolvency. Federal expenditures on highways since 1956 can be seen 
in Figure 2. There is an apparent trend of increasing expenditures each year on highways 
due in part to inflation and increased costs to construct projects. Though solving the gas 
tax issue is outside of the scope of this project, it is important to understand for context 




Figure 2 – Total federal funding for highways from 1956-2010 [16] 
 
Figure 3 below, shows a plot from a report developed by the Congressional 
Budget Office that shows the expected trajectory of the HTF as of 2011. The figure 
shows a clear trajectory toward insolvency by 2013. Even more pressing is that the report 
projects that outlays each year after 2012 will exceed revenues. In the most recent 
transportation act signed summer 2012, annual transportation appropriations for 
transportation were around $50 million per year while the expected gas tax yields were 
about $36 million [17]. The gap of HTF revenue and transportation appropriations must 
be covered by the general fund. In 2013 and 2014, $21.2 million will be transferred from 
the General Fund and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Fund to cover the 
identified gap. The practice of using funds from other accounts to fund transportation is 




Figure 3 -  Highway account balance of the Highway Trust Fund from 1983-2019 [16] 
Recent Federal Transportation Legislation 
A brief look at the past three transportation appropriation bills paints a clear 
picture of how the current political environment has impacted the transportation sector.  
Transportation Equity Act for the 21
st
 Century (TEA-21) was passed in 1998 providing 
$209 billion for transportation funding until the year 2003. A new transportation bill was 
not passed into law until 2005 – Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act – A legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). For two years, Congress was required 
to extend TEA-21 until SAFETEA-LU was passed. SAFETEA-LU provided $286 billion 
for transportation from 2005-2009 [18]. However, SAFETEA-LU had to be extended 
nine times over a three-year period until the creation of Moving Ahead for Progress in the 
21
st
 Century (MAP-21) in 2012. MAP-21 is the current transportation law but was written 
 24 
only for the years 2013 and 2014 and required $19 billion to be transferred from the 
General Fund to help cover the $105 billion legislation [19]. The need for extensions and 
the current transportation bill that is only two years long has a substantial impact on the 
transportation policy environment. New transportation legislation contains new 
regulations and provides its own direction for the country’s transportation system. During 
extension periods and when short-term bills are enacted, agencies face uncertainty 
because worries about what the next legislation will contain, when it will be passed, and 
how short-term changes will impact their projects. This uncertainty makes major 
infrastructure projects more risky and discourages agencies from planning projects that 
may fit future funding criteria. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CONCEPT OF A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BANK 
 
Congress’ inability to consistently and punctually pass progressive transportation 
funding legislation comes at a time of increasing pressure from global competitors, 
accelerating infrastructure asset deterioration, and a growing need for economic engines 
to improve the U.S. economy. Further complicating the matter is the fact that the HTF is 
no longer solvent to fund the nation’s infrastructure. Each of these concerns can be 
directly addressed through increased investment in infrastructure and an ability to more 
effectively disburse infrastructure investments. That is why new devices, such as a 
National Infrastructure Bank (NIB), are needed and can have a substantial impact on 
bringing economic growth to the United States during this period of economic recession. 
The purpose of this section is not to define exactly how an NIB would be structured or 
funded, but rather to provide a better understanding of the concept, review recent policy 
that has been proposed, and display the importance of this mechanism in the current 
economic environment. 
 An NIB is a government entity that provides loans or loan guarantees for major 
infrastructure projects. Different from typical banks, an NIB does not allow for deposits 
from the private sector and receives all capital from annual appropriations by the federal 
government. The funds provided by the NIB are matched by private funding sources in 
order to finance an infrastructure project. Differing from Federal Highway 
Administration grants, NIB loans must be repaid. The interest rates on this repayment are 
typically lower than what can be found on the private market. Additionally, federal 
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financing for infrastructure projects often attract private investment since investors view 
a reduced risk because of government support. NIBs can provide funding for all types of 
infrastructure projects (road, transit, water, energy, ect.), but for the focus of this paper 
only funding provided to transportation infrastructure is relevant. 
Recent Legislation 
Since the start of the Obama administration three major pieces of legislation have 
come forth in support of the creation of an NIB: S. 652, S. 936, and H.R. 402. These bills, 
though different in structure and financing, focus on the same objective of trying to 
develop an entity that can make infrastructure decisions optimized for return-on-
investment. A brief overview of the differences between each of the pieces of legislation 
that have been put forth is shown in Figure 4. To provide an idea of the capital that these 
bills hope to generate, H.R. 402 proposed an initial endowment of $10 billion in the first 
year that could be built upon to provide up to $160 billion in the first decade in public 
funding matched with between $320 billion and $640 billion in private sector investment 
[20]. In all of the scenarios the entity is government supported but differences lie in the 





Figure 4 – Information about Congress’s proposed infrastructure bank bills [21] 
 
In each of the three proposals mentioned above, there are similar strengths that an 
NIB would enable. The first is the ability to leverage public funds to increase investment 
in infrastructure. Funding mechanisms for transportation finance are not adequate at the 
federal level and the use of loans through an NIB would attract more capital from the 
private sector to help overcome the infrastructure funding shortfall. The second strength 
is that the creation of an NIB would allow for the strategic investment of funds to projects 
with the greatest ROI. It is important to realize that ROI in this context refers to the return 
of not just capital but also social good. With limited funds and overwhelming demand, it 
is imperative that the disbursement of funds through an NIB be more targeted than the 
process used by the USDOT formula grant program. Third, funding through NIB would 
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fill a structural funding void for long-term projects that is not filled by the short-term 
transportation appropriation bills. MAP-21, the last transportation appropriation bill was 
a two-year bill with no earmarks for major projects. Without earmarks for funding, long-
term projects cannot rely on being financed through the shorter-term appropriation 
process. The consistency and continuity brought by a long-term NIB funding structure 
would bring more confidence to mega-projects in the transportation sector. Finally, 
funding disbursed through NIBs would be able to introduce more requirements for asset 
and performance management than existing DOT grants. Since the money is attached to 
long-term contracts the asset owners could be required to hold the asset to a higher 
standard during the loan re-payment period and employ better performance management 
strategies. These requirements are the direction of future for USDOT funding but they 
have met roadblocks due to the structure of grant funding. 
The NIB Debate 
Those who disagree with the proposals for an NIB have concerns with the upfront 
costs, overlap with other federal programs, and the number of projects that would fit the 
NIB funding criteria. Estimates for the administrative costs related to establishing an NIB 
have been estimated to range from $100-$240 million [22]. Opponents to the creation of 
NIB argue that these costs are too high to create an entity that would do very similar 
work to the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) that 
provides loans to the same type of transportation infrastructure projects. However, by 
simply analyzing the TIFIA program in recent years one can find reasons to reject this 
argument. Though TIFIA covers a common ground in financing projects that would 
typically apply for NIB funding, it is a subset of highway appropriation bills and sets its 
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funding amounts based on transportation bills that are passed by Congress. In 2012, 
TIFIA was allocated $122 million in funding for transportation infrastructure loans. This 
amount was dwarfed by the $13 billion requested by agencies for the 2012 application 
round. In response to the growing popularity of the program, MAP-21 increased this 
amount to $750 million for 2013 and $1 billion for 2014 [23]. The huge demand for 
TIFIA loans shows that there is a funding void that could be filled by an NIB and the size 
of the TIFIA program is too small to expand to the scale needed. Though the upfront 
costs seem quite large for an NIB, they are miniscule in comparison with the private 
sector funding that would be generated for transportation infrastructure through full 
utilization of NIB funding. 
 An NIB can be a solid step in improving the nation’s infrastructure woes but it is 
only one piece of the puzzle. In all proposals that have been put forth, an NIB is a means 
of increasing infrastructure investment but not a full solution. The amount that will be 
provided through NIB loans is a small subset of the multi-trillion dollar infrastructure 
investment shortfall the U.S. faces. At the core of the problem is the tax collection 
mechanism used to fund transportation infrastructure construction, upkeep, and 
expansion. The creation of an NIB can be a means to provide additional funding in the 
short term as more permanent funding solutions are developed. Once permanent solutions 
are in place an NIB can continue to serve as a catalyst for creating public-private funding 
partnerships in transportation. Finally, the ability to utilize the NIB as an investment 
mechanism that can fund projects outside of the scope of current transportation funding 
sources is an important strength. An NIB has the ability to fund multi-modal projects that 
may be more difficult to construct under the more siloed structure that currently exists. 
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Projects that bring together mass transit, roads, and pedestrian infrastructure can be 
viewed as a single entity to be funded and not split across a variety of funding silos 
within the DOT.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE EXAMPLES OF SUCESSFUL INFRASTRUCTURE BANKS 
 
Support for the creation of an NIB is grounded in more than theoretical 
hopefulness or political jargon. A number of entities, both local and international, reflect 
the success that could be obtained through an NIB. Although no NIB currently exists, 32 
domestic state infrastructure banks (SIB), a European Investment Bank, and the TIFIA 
program through the USDOT are in operation. These programs are strong examples of 
the positive impact an infrastructure bank could create. This section will look at examples 
of each of these entities to shed light on the success of existing infrastructure investment 
mechanisms that are providing loans, loan guarantees, and credit assistance to 
infrastructure projects and infrastructure owners.  
State Infrastructure Banks 
The 1995 National Highway System (NHS) Designation Act piloted the creation 
of the first SIBs in the United States. A pilot program allowed states to use a portion of 
their federal transportation allocation as “seed money” for the initial capitalization of an 
SIB. This “seed money” was then matched in a separate account with additional funds 
from state budgets to further grow the SIB capital amount. Ten states participated in the 
initial pilot group through this legislation: Arizona, Florida, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Two additional states, California and Missouri, 
became part of the pilot group and by the beginning of 1997 12 SIBs had been created. 
The objective of the SIB portion of the 1995 Act was to allow states to create a 
“revolving fund” that could be used for providing sustained and reliable financial 
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assistance to projects within their jurisdiction. The term “revolving fund” is often used 
when referring to the funding structure of SIBs. SIBs typically provide financial 
assistance to infrastructure projects in the form of loans or credit assistance. Funds 
provided by the SIB are then paid back to the institution according to the regulations and 
rates outlined in the initial agreement. Once the money has been paid back to the bank it 
has “revolved” and can be disbursed again to fund another project. 
After the 12 pilot programs, funding for SIBs grew in 1997 with a $150 million 
federal appropriation for the expansion of existing, and the creation of new, SIBs. This 
appropriation expanded the number of SIBs to 23 and even spurred the creation of two 
multistate SIBs – Nebraska-North Dakota-South Dakota-Wyoming and Arkansas-
Tennessee. The 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21
st
 Century (TEA-21) provided 
even more funding for SIBs while instituting requirements on the federal funds disbursed 
through SIBs. After 1998, only a handful of additional SIBs were created. One reason for 
this could have been changes to the SIB program under TEA-21. TEA-21 required that 
all SIBs that received federal capitalization consider all projects that received funding 
subject to federal funding requirements. This meant that all projects of all sizes would 
have to conform to these requirements even if not applicable if provided funding through 
other sources. Furthermore, this requirement was made in perpetuity. All projects funded 
by the SIB would be subject to these requirements even after the federal dollars that were 
used for the initial capitalization had circulated and were no longer directly deposited by 
the federal government [24]. This was a major concern because of the long-term future 
implications for any SIB capitalized during this period. The 2005 Safe Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) Act 
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also included provisions to allow all states to create SIBs but kept intact the requirements 
on projects using revolved federal dollars – resulting in no new banks being created. 
Through the original pilot and early adopters of the program, 32 states and Puerto Rico 
have created some type of revolving fund for transportation infrastructure, shown in 
Figure 5 [25]. 
 
Figure 5 – State infrastructure banks across the United States [24] 
 
The effectiveness and utilization of state infrastructure banks varies greatly from 
one to the next. Some states readily utilize their revolving fund to provide financing for 
projects while others have found that the scope of projects that can use the funding is too 
limited. Overall, projects supported by SIBs received $7.3 billion in financial assistance 
from 1995-2012. Though this amount is dwarfed by the $1.4 trillion that states have spent 
on transportation projects over the time frame, it is a sizable amount that can be built 
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upon. Though a number of banks exist, only a handful are active and continue to leverage 
their SIB as a creative funding alternative. SIB loan disbursements are highly 
concentrated in five states that account for 75 percent of the total loan disbursements – 
South Carolina, Florida, Arizona, Texas, and California. Furthermore, another five states 
have only entered one loan agreement since the creation of their SIB – Alaska, Arkansas, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Utah [24]. The variation in states utilizing this funding 
mechanism is likely because many states created their SIBs around 1995 as an 
opportunity to gain more federal grant money through matching it with state funds. Once 
the account was set up there was less effort put forth to utilize the funds, especially in the 
years leading up to the recent recession. During this period public agencies and the 
private sector were often able to secure bond financing that was competitive with the 
treasury rate. Some states were able to maneuver this competitive environment and find a 
niche for their SIB, However, 10 of the original 32 states have SIBs that are no longer 
active [24]. 
Among the SIBs that are active, there are three distinct types – (1) conventional 
SIBs, (2) state-capitalized SIBs, and (3) infrastructure investment funds. Conventional 
SIBs utilize the revolving fund structure that is capitalized by both federal and matching 
state funds. This type of bank is the most common and is present in some states in 
parallel with the other two types. The second type of SIB is a state-capitalized 
transportation revolving fund. This type of fund functions almost identical to the 
conventional SIB but is totally state funded – meaning there are no federal funds in the 
account. These accounts tend to be smaller in size but provide the state with greater 
flexibility when disbursing funds since they do not have to conform to federal funding 
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requirements. Finally, there are infrastructure investment funds. These funds can either be 
public or private entities but in both cases these types of funds look to finance public 
works projects and are not confined to strictly supporting transportation infrastructure. 
The various types of state revolving funds are shown below in Figure 6. State revolving 
funds can be used for any form of infrastructure and actually began as a means to fund 
water infrastructure projects.  
 
Figure 6 – Structure of different state infrastructure bank types [24] 
South Carolina’s Conventional State Infrastructure Bank  
South Carolina has one of the oldest SIBs in the country and is the best example 
of a state that has found ways to utilize this funding source. South Carolina’s SIB has 
provided nearly $2.8 billion in financial assistance over the 18 years it has been 
operating.  This amount totals to almost 40 percent of all SIB loans nationwide. In order 
to allow the initial capitalization to stretch further, the bank leveraged its capitalization on 
the bond market to increase the loanable amount. In order to make bond payments the 
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state dedicates $120 million per year from registration fees and state gas tax revenues. 
Money from the South Carolina SIB provides both grants and loans to projects; giving 
preference to projects with sizable local matches. Funding from the SC SIB is reserved 
for highway and bridge projects that exceed $100 million and transit projects of any size. 
However, all projects have been highways and bridges. A seven-person board of directors 
consisting of state DOT personnel, state government leaders, and Governor appointed 
individuals governs the South Carolina SIB. The board reviews project applications and 
is guided by the mission, “To focus greater attention on larger transportation projects, and 
thereby allow SCDOT to devote resources to other important transportation projects” 
[26]. The success garnered by South Carolina has become a model for many states 
around the nation and is often referenced in Congress when discussing an NIB. 
Florida’s State-Capitalized State Infrastructure Bank 
Six states have a state-capitalized fund operating in parallel with a conventional 
SIB and two states have a single SIB that is solely state funded. Florida is the best 
example of a state with two distinct accounts for their SIB. The first account is the 
conventional SIB that was set up during the first pilots but has not been recapitalized 
since 2004. The second account is solely state funded and capitalized by general revenue 
bond proceeds and state funds [25]. According to Florida officials, “SIB participation 
from the state-funded account is limited to a transportation facility project that is on the 
State Highway System or that provides for increased mobility on the state's transportation 
system in accordance with Section 339.55, Florida Statutes or provides for intermodal 
connectivity with airports, seaports, rail facilities, transportation terminals, and other 
intermodal options for increased accessibility and movement of people, cargo, and 
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freight” [27]. All assistance provided by this bank is in the form of loans; unlike South 
Carolina where grant money is sometimes granted.  
The success of the Florida SIB is in part due to its ability to fit the context of the 
projects it funds. The bank has the flexibility to adapt its financing to fit the project’s 
structure. Depending on risk and a number of criteria, the interest rate can be adjusted 
depending on the project and the repayment terms are tailored to the project with the 
ability to defer repayment for up to five years. This flexibility can be invaluable for 
projects that may need time to build their revenue stream [25]. The bank hopes to fund 
projects that have already received financing but need some extra help in reaching their 
total. This criterion allows the bank to further leverage the assistance it provides with 
private sector loans or federal grant money. Florida’s SIB has provided almost $1.2 
billion in loans to 76 projects around the state [24]. Furthermore, this $1.2 billion has 
been leveraged to over $8.4 billion in projects when combined with funding provided by 
other sources. According to Jessica Weeks the Florida SIB Project Manager, “We look at 
the (state infrastructure bank) as a major tool in our ‘financial toolbox’ with hopes of a 
viable program in good and bad economic times. During these tough economic times, the 
(state infrastructure bank) has still been able to provide loans at or below market rates 
and fund numerous transportation projects that have provided a safe transportation 
system ensuring the movement of people and goods” [25]. Each year, Florida receives 
more applications than they can fund showing the demand for this funding source. 
Infrastructure Investment Funds 
Recent examples of these public infrastructure funds have been highly sited in the 
media. Examples include the Chicago Infrastructure Trust and the proposed New York 
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Works Infrastructure Fund. Many of the private examples are international funds or 
domestic funds that are investing internationally in infrastructure. However, there is 
growing interest in domestic funds to invest directly into infrastructure projects outside of 
the bond market. Illinois is a state that never pursued the original SIB proposals so it has 
never had an entity of that type. In 2012, Mayor Rahm Emanuel passed a proposal 
through the city council that would allow for the creation of the Chicago Infrastructure 
Trust. This trust would serve as a public-private partnership to provide funds for public 
works projects that have typically been government funded while providing private 
investors a return on investment. Since the trust is in its infancy there have not been any 
major projects financed to date but there is great anticipation for what will come out of 
this partnership and other cities around the country are contemplating this same proposal. 
In early 2013, the trust took its first steps by publishing a request for qualifications for 
pension funds, banks, financial firms, and others that would be interested in financing up 
to $200 million in retrofitting the buildings of Chicago for energy efficiency [28]. Since 
this fund is quite novel and yet to be tested, it is too early to judge its effectiveness. 
Additionally, Chicago’s and New York’s multi-infrastructure funding approach makes 
them too broad for the scope of this discussion on NIBs for transportation funding. 
SIB Implications for an NIB 
The success and shortcomings of state infrastructure banks have clear 
implications on the argument for creating an NIB. Many argue that infrastructure can be 
handled at the state level and that the power to create entities like an infrastructure bank 
should be handled by states. This is a plausible argument that is supported by the large 
amount of money spent each year on transportation at the state level for state-specific 
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projects. As shown in Figure 7, transportation funding at the state level often amounts to 
two to three times what is spent at the federal level each year. Furthermore, there are 
some clear advantages of creating SIBs over a single NIB, the first being the ability to 
focus on the local level and make decisions that are optimized based on the local criteria 
and vision. This is undoubtedly a strength when viewed at a local or state scale and not 
the national scale. Many projects that may be strategic at the state or local level may not 
be within the scope of federal funding and may even be further complicated with the use 
of federal funding. However, if anything is to be learned from the success of South 
Carolina and the funding requirements of NIB legislation, most of the projects that fit the 
scope of this type of funding will exceed $100 million and likely be within the scope of 
federal funding.  
 
Figure 7 – United States transportation expenditures at State and Federal levels [16] 
 
From a financial standpoint SIBs have two major benefits: (1) the accounting 
requirements at the state level allow for revolving funds to be viewed based on their 
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balance and not a debt to the state, which is in contrast to what happens at the federal 
level and (2) states have the ability to further leverage their capitalization by bonding – 
an option not available for an NIB. The accounting requirements at the state level allow 
for most states to provide loans as long as the revolving account remains solvent. This is 
important because the risk and amount that the state government is able to subsidize 
projects does not have to show up on the state budget. However, at the federal level the 
circumstances are very different due to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. This act 
requires that all of the subsidy cost over the life of the loan be included in the federal 
budget as a net present valuation at the time the loan is disbursed. Therefore, repayments 
of the loan are also part of the net present value of the loan and must go on the federal 
budget [29]. This provision inhibits the revolving of repayment funds that is enabled at 
the state level. The inclusion of risk and the net present valuation of the loan to include 
all subsidies at the time of disbursement inflates the NIB’s impact on the federal budget 
even if it is an independently operating entity.  
More tangibly, this provision requires an NIB with an appropriation of $25 billion 
to have an additional $225 billion in “callable capital” from the Treasury [21]. 
Restrictions like the 1990 Act and others make it infeasible to leverage the capitalization 
of the NIB to the level that states are permitted. States can leverage SIB funds through 
bonding, then further leverage the funds by providing partial loans to projects with the 
private sector covering the remainder. An NIB only has the potential to leverage funds 
through the partial financing of projects that will have private sector matching funds 
because of a number of restrictions that would make bonding the capitalization amount 
unlawful.   
 41 
The disadvantages of SIBs as a means of increasing infrastructure investment are 
quite clear. The most obvious reason being that all states are currently able to utilize SIBs 
for transportation infrastructure funding and very few have been successful in leveraging 
this ability. With 75 percent of all SIB loans being concentrated in only 5 states and the 
total loan amount only accounting for 0.5 percent of all state transportation investments, 
it is clear that SIBs in their current form will not profoundly increase the amount invested 
in infrastructure [24]. Though centers of excellence have been found in a handful of 
states, the adoption of this funding source is not growing at the pace that is needed. Even 
if SIBs were growing fast enough to fill the present funding void, there are two structural 
shortfalls of developing banks at the state level. The patterns of economic growth and 
travel are continually moving toward megaregions. As economies become more tied to 
their region the boundaries of transportation investments will expand beyond states and 
require strategic invests to be made in infrastructure from a regional/national perspective. 
One could argue that multi-state infrastructure banks could be the solution to this but in 
the two multi-state banks that have been e formed they were unable to provide a single 
loan due to misaligned priorities [29].  States most often will not make decisions from a 
multi-state perspective – that is the job of the federal government.  Thus, transportation 
investment decisions that are multi-state in nature should arguably be made at the 
appropriate level of government. This has historically been the case with the Interstate 
Highway System and sectors outside of transportation because it fits the structure of the 
Nation’s government system. Building upon this point, an NIB allows for targeted 
investment decisions to optimize the limited funds of the bank for the best strategy for the 
Nation. Instead of making piecemeal decisions at just the state level, an NIB allows for a 
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comprehensive and system-level decision to be made each year on the investment of 
funds in transportation. There is no reason that the two types of banks must be mutually 
exclusive. The transportation investment needs of the United States are large and utilizing 
the abilities of SIBs along with an NIB will provide more capital that can be leveraged 
with private sector funding. 
The European Investment Bank  
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the most prominent example of an 
infrastructure bank in the world. The EIB, created under terms of the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, is capitalized by the 27 member countries of the European Union (EU) [21]. The 
original purpose of the EIB was to fund infrastructure projects that the European 
governments and private sector would not fund. This purpose has shifted since the 1950s 
with the emergence of more funding sources for public and private projects, but the EIB 
continues to be the premier lending sources for major infrastructure projects [30].  The 
EIB provides longer term, low-interest loans, loan guarantees, and technical support to 
major infrastructure projects across Europe and in some cases around the globe. The 
projects funded by the EIB align with the objectives of the EU and are not confined to 
any one sector of the infrastructure system – i.e. transportation, energy, water, 
universities, hospitals, etc. All funding provided by the EIB is repaid by the borrower and 
despite being a non-profit entity the bank earns a profit each year. In 2012, the EIB’s 
profit was a record-high €2.7 billion ($3.5 billion) and all earnings were deposited back 
into the fund to increase the capitalization amount [31]. 
As a financially independent entity owned by the EU member nations, the EIB is 
able to raise funds through bonds that are sold to investors internationally. These bonds 
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allow for further capital to be raised and invested into infrastructure projects. Loans 
provided by the EIB finance no more than 50 percent of a project’s overall infrastructure 
project costs. Though the total project cost is never covered, obtaining EIB funding tends 
to attract other investors and allow for the funding from the bank to be further leveraged 
with other funding sources [17]. Projects funded by the bank are agreed upon by the 28 
member Board of Directors that represent the interests of all EU nations and an appointed 
Chairman. In addition to the Board of Trustees, the Board can include up to six experts in 
meetings with non-voting rights to serve in an advisory capacity. Funded projects must 
align with the overall vision and priorities set by the EU Commission, although priorities 
can include developmental interests outside of the EU. This allows for funds to be 
provided to nations outside the EU with ties to the union. In Error! Reference source 
not found., the breakdown for funding by geographic location can be seen. Of the €61 
billion provide for loans in 2011, €7 billion went to interests outside of the EU [32].  
 
Figure 8 - Breakdown of EIB loans in 2011 by region [32] 
 
 The EIB’s presence has left a positive and long-lasting impact on the development 
of the EU. Since its creation, the bank has provided €965 billion ($1.25 trillion) in loans 
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to infrastructure projects in the interests of the EU. Stability and consistency are two 
important characteristics the EIB has embodied [33]. Regardless of the economic climate 
and regulatory environment, the EIB has been able to provide loans to major projects and 
continue its mission of connecting the EU through infrastructure. Its strong performance 
and financial portfolio has earned the EIB Triple A ratings from Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch [31]. The current focus of the EIB is small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
regional development, and environmental sustainability. These focus areas are aimed at 
creating jobs, addressing the economic and social imbalances present across the EU 
member countries, and combating climate change. The focus areas are based on the 
overarching EU objectives and used to select priority areas when providing funding. The 
breakdown of loans by sector for loans provided by the EIB in 2011 can be seen in Figure 
9. Shifting priorities by the EIB help dictate the distribution of funding by sector each 
year.  
 
Figure 9 – Breakdown of EIB loans by infrastructure sector [34] 
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The clear success of the EIB and the positive outcomes of infrastructure 
investment for the region have prompted an aggressive growth strategy for the bank. The 
rate the EIB has expanded over the past two decades is impressive. In the early 1990s, the 
bank held a capital-base of less than €30 billion ($39 billion). This number rose to €232 
billion by 2009. Recent political statements indicate even more growth in the NIB’s 
immediate future [35]. During 2011, the bank provided approximately €61 billion ($79 
billion) in infrastructure loans to 454 projects in 70 countries [36]. Werner Hoyer, 
President of the EIB, stated in a February 2013 press release, “Last year the EIB has 
delivered on changing its course fundamentally from a programmed cyclical to a 
countercyclical course. We are now prepared to deliver on boosting our lending activities 
by 40% per year from 2013-2015 and thus making an extraordinary effort in these 
exceptional times for Europe. The EU Bank will be making a significant and tangible 
contribution to overcoming the current crisis” [37]. Sustainable growth and employment 
are the focal point for growing the EIB’s capital amount and providing more loans to 
European projects.  
There are similarities and differences to the long-standing EIB compared to the 
recent proposals for an NIB. The EIB is a model for the NIB. The organizational 
structure of the EIB with a board of trustee panel that makes decisions is very similar to 
NIB proposals. The NIB proposals have scaled down to a smaller number of trustees – 
ranging from 5-7 as opposed to the EIB 28 member board [21], [36]. The EIB Board of 
Trustees makes loan decisions based on a number of factors, although the major priority 
is to select projects that align with the vision and objectives of the EU. An NIB Board of 
Trustees would follow very similar parameters when making decisions. A key strength of 
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the NIB would be to put forth a national direction for infrastructure growth that would 
guide the selection of projects. The ability to view the infrastructure network of the 
United States as a system and select projects that have the best return on investment for 
the entire system allows for the best use of limited funds.  
Financially, the two banks have many similarities. The structure by which loans 
are provided and paid back is seemingly identical. Both banks have the same objective of 
leveraging their capital to provide the largest amount of investment into infrastructure 
possible. The EIB does this in two ways: selling bonds on the international market to the 
private sector to increase the bank’s capital and by providing only a percentage of the 
total project costs in loans.  The ability to sell bonds to increase capital has only been 
included in one of the three NIB proposals  – H.R. 402 [21]. However, all bills for an 
NIB have included an upper loan percentage limit like the EIB. The EIB has set this limit 
at 50 percent of the total project budget; the same percentage number has been discussed 
for an NIB [35]. Finally, both banks require callable capital from the governments they 
are supported by in case of excessive loan defaults by funding recipients. Each of the 
member nations of the EU must ensure that funds are available based on a risk 
assessment of the loans provided. This structure is a larger factor in the United States due 
to the requirements of the Credit Reform Act of 1990. This act along with other 
government sanctions prevents an NIB from functioning as a “revolving fund.” 
Furthermore, the total burden of the risk from bank loans falls on a single government 
with an NIB as opposed to 27 different nations with the EIB. Though the need for 
callable capital for backing is the same for both banks, it is clear that the legal, financial, 
and regulatory implications are quite different. 
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Many of the differences between the EIB and NIB are a result of the EIB being an 
independent entity. This independent structure allows for the bank to have its own credit 
rating and not fall under the umbrella of the government of any one nation. This is an 
advantage for the EIB since it can work as its own entity and build a record of sound 
finances regardless of the European economic climate. Transparency has been a concern 
of the public at times with the EIB. However, as an independent institution, the EIB is not 
as bound to constituents or public scrutiny to the same degree as the government. This 
structure has been important in the selection of projects and the distributions of funds 
across all EU nations. 
The spectrum of projects that can be funded by the EIB is quite different from the 
NIB proposals. Minimum loan amounts for the two entities are different and the disparity 
points to the scope of the projects the banks hope to fund. The EIB funds projects of more 
than €25 million ($32.4 million), while the NIB proposals have set the lower boundary 
for funding at $100 million for urban projects and $50 million for rural [17], [38]. The 
EIB has set its funding scope to include smaller projects that may have an impact on the 
metropolitan level. In contrast, the NIB focuses on major projects that will have impacts 
at the regional or national scale. The NIB will focus on a smaller segment of the total 
infrastructure market ensuring that qualifying projects have widespread effects on the 
nation. Additionally, the EIB funds many sectors of the infrastructure industry. For the 
scope of this paper, all NIB proposals are being evaluated as entities solely focused on 
providing financing for the transportation sector. Again, this boundary makes the NIB 
more narrowly defined in scope than the EIB.  
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Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) 
The Transportation Infrastructure Financing Innovation Act (TIFIA) has the greatest 
resemblance to an NIB of any domestic program. TIFIA was passed by Congress in 1998 
and reauthorized in the past two transportation bills in 2005 and 2012. The purpose of 
TIFIA was to provide a long-term loan funding source for state and local governments as 
well as close the funding gap on large transportation projects. Unlike the EIB, TIFIA only 
funds transportation infrastructure projects. Financial assistance from TIFIA comes in the 
forms of loans, loan guarantees, and direct credit. As of 2012, the TIFIA program had 
provided $10.5 billion in funding assistance to projects around the country. TIFIA 
funding has been leveraged with other funding sources to invest $42.2 billion in 
transportation projects [39].  
 TIFIA loans are given to qualifying state and local projects with repayment 
periods of up to 35 years. In order to qualify, projects must meet a number of criteria 
including: project costs over $50 million, a dedicated revenue source, and meet all federal 
laws. Eligible projects can receive loans up to 49 percent of the total project budget [40]. 
This amount has historically been 33 percent but was increased with the most recent 
transportation law, MAP-21. Interest rates on TIFIA loans are pegged to the Treasury rate 
on the date that the loan is given. The highly competitive interest rate makes TIFIA 
funding attractive to agencies. Moreover, projects with TIFIA financing more easily raise 
funds from private sector sources. Since TIFIA is focused on infrastructure construction 
and not profit, the repayment terms on loans are more flexible than many other sources. 
In addition to the low interest rate, interest and principal payments can be deferred on 
revenue collecting projects for up to five years to allow time for a capital base to 
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accumulate. Of the 31 projects that have been funded by TIFIA, the first and only default 
in the history of the program came in 2011 with the San Diego South Bay Expressway 
[41]. Despite this single blemish, the program has a strong history of making sound 
financial investments on projects. 
 The success of the TIFIA program is a clear indicator of the demand for a funding 
source to provide loans toward transportation infrastructure projects. As mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, MAP-21 increased TIFIA from $122 million in 2012, to $750 million 
in 2013, and $1 billion in 2014. This increase is meant to address the  demand on  funds 
with over $13 billion in applications for 2012 [23]. However, the program has also 
implemented some more questionable changes. The first, mentioned above, is the 
increase on the loan amount from 33 percent of the project cost to 49 percent [40]. This 
change will likely increase the application pool, but means that fewer projects will be 
funded overall. Furthermore, this change decreases the DOT’s ability to leverage federal 
dollars with private sector funding. With the major funding shortfall the nation faces, 
putting more of the already constrained federal funding available into fewer projects will 
not help close the funding gap. Another questionable change is that projects will now be 
funded on a first come first serve basis. Though projects must still meet all funding 
criteria, there will no longer be an analysis across all applications to select the projects 
that will be the highest impact and return on investment. This change removes the DOT’s 
ability to make funding decisions that are in the interest of a unified and defined national 
vision or objective for infrastructure construction.  
 Financially there are very significant differences between TIFIA and an NIB. 
Ideally, an NIB would be capitalized through apportionments from the general fund. 
 50 
These apportionments would be new capital invested into infrastructure at the 
government level –outside of the funds already invested through the Highway Trust 
Fund. An investment from the general fund to an NIB would show the priority being 
placed on the country’s infrastructure and provide more funding to the sector. This is 
very different from TIFIA, which is funded through the HTF as part of each 
transportation law. Money going to TIFIA is paid out of the same pool of funds that all 
other transportation currently comes from. Simply increasing TIFIA’s funding amount 
does not do anything to increase the amount invested in infrastructure at the federal level. 
Additionally, TIFIA has no revolving structure making it non-sustainable. Loan payments 
from TIFIA financing are not put back into a TIFIA account to provide future loans. 
Since TIFIA must be renewed with each transportation law it is subject to the volatility of 
politics. The past three transportation bills have been signed into law long after their 
original reauthorization dates. Being subject to this type of appropriation structure makes 
TIFIA a less reliable funding source than an NIB that would need upfront appropriations 
but could sustain itself after the initial investment. Major projects cannot risk an 
unreliable funding source and an NIB overcomes that barrier. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PRESIDENTIAL LESSONS OF THE PAST APPLIED TO THE 
PRESENT 
 
The creation of a National Infrastructure Bank will not be an easy task for the 
Obama administration. Currently, the political environment is very polarized and has 
proven to be a difficult environment to garner bi-partisan support for issues that have not 
been historically very politically charged. Infrastructure has long been an issue that can 
garner across-the-aisle support as it deals with building a foundation for the future of our 
nation. This was seen in summer 2012 with the passing of MAP-21 that was sponsored 
by Democratic Senator Barbra Boxer and co-sponsored by two Republican Congressmen 
during an election year. Building upon a foundation of bi-partisan support, the following 
four major lessons from the leadership of Presidents Roosevelt and Eisenhower can be 
applied to the present: (1) transportation should be viewed as an enabler of a larger 
objective, (2) the criticality of timing, (3) the importance of educating strategic 
stakeholders, and (4) compromise is essential. 
A Means to Greater Ends 
During Roosevelt and Eisenhower’s presidencies there were two issues of 
paramount importance, defense and the economy. Both presidents connected the 
transportation legislation to these two concerns to build support. The National Interstate 
System was deemed the National Interstate and Defense System in 1941. Constructing 
highways was no longer a postal or logistical issue, like it had been in the past. Instead, 
the lack of a nationwide highway system was a safety and defense concern for the entire 
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country. This came at a time directly following World War II and the Korean War so the 
concerns of defense were fresh on the minds of the public and Congress. Eisenhower’s 
used his experience of traveling the country via convoy in 1919 and seeing the German 
highway system during World War II to increase his credibility when making these 
statements. History shows that infrastructure presented as a means to an end rather than 
infrastructure for its own sake has been more effective in garnering the necessary support 
to pass federal legislation. 
As the Great Depression lingered in the memories of most Americans, making 
highways an economic issue also helped support their case. Roosevelt saw highways as 
part of his New Deal and an economic engine for the country. Under his administration, 
millions additional dollars were allocated toward road funding than ever before. When 
resources were not present to build, he focused on investing in the planning of roads to 
create jobs and prepare for the future. Eisenhower framed this issue to Congress through 
the economic activity lost due to road incidents and congestion along with projecting the 
jobs and economic growth that would come from constructing the road network. 
Connecting infrastructure to defense and economy made it an issue that transcended 
moving people and goods from one location to another and allowed the cause to resound 
in the hearts of all Americans. 
 Infrastructure is an issue that is often discussed but is usually low priority. If an 
NIB is to be created it will undoubtedly take connecting infrastructure to a national 
concern or aspiration that is a higher priority. Similar to during Roosevelt’s presidency, 
the U.S. is in a period of slow job growth and recovery from a major economic crisis. 
Economic growth and jobs are undoubtedly two concerns of the American people and 
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Congress. Realizing and communicating the economic growth in the short and long-term 
in a way that people can relate to will be paramount in elevating the priority of an NIB. 
Conveying the over $200 billion lost to congestion each year that can be alleviated by 
infrastructure investment is important. It will be equally important to convey this in terms 
that the average citizen, business, and various other stakeholders can directly relate to – 
such as the average amount of money wasted on gas each year by family or business due 
to congestion. In 1976, 1 of 6 jobs in the nation was connected to the transportation sector 
and every dollar spent on transportation yielded $2.90 in public benefit [6]. Though the 
economic opportunities from transportation investment may not be as large as they once 
were, it is estimated that for every $1 billion invested in infrastructure 29,000 jobs are 
created [22]. Communicating statistics of this nature will aid in the garnering of public 
support. 
 With the changes in defense strategy and military combat since the 1950s, 
connecting transportation infrastructure policy to defense does not have the same 
practical relevance that it once did. However, there is a growing issue of national safety 
from natural disasters that is at the forefront of the American public and Congress. The 
impact and loss of lives from natural disasters like hurricanes Katrina and Sandy have 
been a sobering reminder of the dilapidated infrastructure in the United States and present 
a teaching moment that can be capitalized upon. The nation’s evacuation routes for 
natural disasters have failed to stand the test and the damage created by these weather 
conditions have demolished weakened transportation assets that were already long 
overdue for repairs. Connecting legislation for transportation infrastructure funding 
through an NIB to the recent natural disasters could generate more public support than 
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narrowly focusing on the infrastructure issue as an end in itself. Realizing and 
communicating that these natural disasters will continue to occur, and perhaps even grow 
in magnitude, can be another tool to elevate the priority of infrastructure. President 
Obama took a strong stance on climate change in his inaugural address stating, “We will 
respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would betray 
our children and future generations. Some may still deny the overwhelming judgment of 
science, but none can avoid the devastating impact of raging fires, and crippling drought, 
and more powerful storms. The path towards sustainable energy sources will be long and 
sometimes difficult [42].” While climate change continues to be a controversial issue in 
Congress, it will be important to address the importance of infrastructure investment to 
combat natural disasters from an approach that does not sidetrack the conversation to a 
debate about climate change. 
 The financial evidence supporting investment in infrastructure to mitigate future 
natural disasters leads to a clear conclusion. A study conducted by the Multihazard 
Mitigation Council (MMC), part of the National Institute of Building Sciences, found that 
every “dollar spent on mitigation saves society an average of $4” [43]. These savings are 
relevant for flood, hurricanes, tornados, and earthquake natural disasters. Savings come 
in the form of reduced direct property damage, less direct and indirect business 
interruption, reduced human losses, and decreased costs for emergency response.  The 
MMC study found that of the $3.5 billion that had been invested by FEMA to mitigate 
natural disasters had yielded a discounted present value of $14 billion that would been 
required if not invested prior to natural disasters [43]. These numbers are extremely 
important to keep in mind in the wake of Hurricanes Sandy, Katrina, and the many more 
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natural disasters that have hit the nation over the past decade. Damages from Hurricane 
Sandy have been estimated to have exceeded $71.3 billion. The Metro Transit Authority 
in New York estimated that Hurricane Sandy caused $4.75 billion in damages to its 
transit assets alone [44]. Furthermore, the economic losses of Hurricane Sandy were 
estimated to be $62 billion. This amount ranks it second only after Hurricane Katrina, 
which caused $128 billion in economic losses [45]. Retroactively repairing struggling 
infrastructure it has been hit by natural disasters is far more costly to the economy and the 
government, which must intervene through FEMA to make repairs, than taking a 
proactive approach. NIB proposals should emphasis the long-term federal savings from 
creating a NIB that can target venerable infrastructure prior to natural disasters. 
Timing is Key 
The next lesson is timing. Eisenhower took office as the Korean War came to an 
end and immediately passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954. This act was a 
necessary first step to bide time for passing the more controversial and robust 1956 bill. 
The timing utilized by both of these presidents directly aligns with what the United States 
is currently seeing. The United States is bringing a close to almost a decade long period 
of war and focus on expensive foreign policy. It is now time to focus and invest 
domestically to create jobs for those returning home from war and spur economic 
development more broadly across a struggling economy. Last year’s MAP-21 was a short 
two-year transportation appropriation that will soon require a reauthorization and what 
many hope will be a more long-term solution. MAP-21 should serve as the current 
administration’s Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1954, a two-year appropriation to buy time 
for a more comprehensive sustainable solution. The next two years constitute excellent 
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timing for the creation of an NIB if the past is to be used as a model for the present. The 
process of passing NIB legislation will be long and arduous so if the administration hopes 
to take advantage of this ideal timing the process must begin immediately.  
Identify and Align Critical Stakeholders 
The difference between the legislation put forth during Eisenhower’s 
administration in 1955 and what was passed in 1956 was not totally in the content of the 
bills. Environmental factors greatly swayed the outcome of congressional votes. One of 
the biggest shifts seen between 1955 and 1956 was with the direction of lobbyists. In 
1955, major lobbying organizations were against passing any legislation that would 
increase gas and rubber taxes. Organizations like AAA, tire companies, oil companies, 
and even some states’ leadership were very vocal on Capitol Hill about the negative 
effects of financing roads through increased user-fees. However, in 1956 the proportion 
of lobbyists in favor of the passing legislation with user-fee financing was far greater than 
the opponents. It is not known exactly what brought fewer lobbyists against the issue in 
1956, but the groups that were opposing the bill are the ones who have gained the most 
from highway construction. 
 Educating stakeholders likely played a role in shifting lobbyists from being 
strong opponents in 1955 to becoming neutral in 1956. The NIB issue has been fortunate 
to have bi-partisan support but that should not be a reason to ignore the importance of 
communicating and educating strategic stakeholders to ensure they are present and active 
in Washington supporting the legislation. Eisenhower recognized this in 1954 when he 
had VP Nixon address the Governor’s to educate them early in the process and inform 
them on the positive outcomes for their states and constituents. Having the state 
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leadership supporting the highway system would allow the President more leverage with 
Congress. After gaining governor support, Eisenhower was able to build public support 
and ensure that there was pressure on Congress to follow through with legislation. 
Compromise is Necessary 
The final and essential lesson is compromise that will be critical in passing any 
legislation related to transportation in Congress. Compromise was a tool that President 
Eisenhower used to ensure that he did not delay the 1956 Act. The major issue in passing 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 was undoubtedly financing. Eisenhower’s stance, 
along with his Treasury Secretary, was that the roads should be self-liquidating through 
user-toll but few others in Congress agreed with this idea [14]. Instead of pushing his 
viewpoint on Congress, Eisenhower yielded to their leadership. Through the period 
leading up to 1956, Eisenhower constantly challenged Congress and others to develop 
solutions and ideas. This was seen in 1954 in the speech delivered by VP Nixon in place 
of Eisenhower and in his 1955 correspondences with Congress. In each scenario he 
pressed the importance of an Interstate Highway system and the advantages it could 
bring. Instead of asserting his unyielding position on solving the interstate issue, 
Eisenhower engaged his audience to become involved and develop a solution that they 
saw best fit. Eisenhower’s approach developed more consensus and buy-in than more 
stern alternatives. In other words, he focused on the ends; he was flexible about the 
means.  
The current climate between Congress and the office of the Presidency is very 
different than the environment in which Eisenhower maneuvered, but compromise and 
building buy-in are effective approaches ensuring legislative progress. The hyper-partisan 
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environment of the current Congress will require compromise from both parties and a 
willingness from leaders to communicate across the parties in order for a NIB solution to 
be reached. An important lesson that can be learned from Eisenhower’s presidency and 
employed by the current administration is the “hidden-hand” approach. This term was 
coined by author Fred Greenstein to explain Eisenhower’s approach to politics.  
Eisenhower often worked behind the scenes with his staff and various 
congressmen to enable legislation had proper support. This approach allowed for more 
bi-partisan support by not allowing the politics of presidential interests and agendas to 
detract from the legislation. By working behind the scenes Eisenhower was often thought 
to be the “do-nothing” president. Though this may not have made him the most popular 
president in the eyes of the media and public at times, it allowed him to work with 
congress and pursue his agenda. President Obama has been very vocal in his support of 
the NIB. Though his support has helped raise the awareness of the proposal, it also 
polarizes an issue that has bi-partisan support. Following in the steps of Eisenhower, 
President Obama should allow a bi-partisan group of congressmen to lead the effort to 
pass NIB legislation. Though it is an important matter to the administration, removing the 
President from being the champion of the issue can help ease the hyper-partisan struggles 
the legislation faces in the current Congress. NIB legislation has a better opportunity to 
pass in Congress if it is viewed based on the merit of the proposal rather than a partisan 
solution for infrastructure. A compromise on an NIB is more likely to be seen through a 
bi-partisan approach that can be viewed as a victory for the country, not the presidential 




CONCLUSIONS AND A PATH FORWARD 
 
The United States’ approach to financing, planning, and constructing 
transportation has evolved over time and at each step of the evolution there has been 
much debate among opposing viewpoints. Until 1956, the method of financing 
transportation infrastructure shifted between private and public sector with thoughts that 
funding should be provided through bonds, excessive condemnation, property tax, gas 
tax, and the general fund. Since 1956, the transportation financing mechanism has 
remained static, financed by a gas tax that has not increased in two decades. The 
depletion of the HTF and underinvestment in infrastructure has left the nation less 
competitive globally because of deteriorating infrastructure. Ending this trend will 
require political leaders to reevaluate the nation’s transportation financing scheme and 
make changes to a system that has been virtually unchanged for over 50 years. The 
creation of an NIB is a change that can address a portion of the funding challenges the 
nation faces by attracting private sector investment to infrastructure, enabling a strategic 
ROI approach to rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure and providing a loan mechanism 
that is in high demand for new mega infrastructure projects.  
 
Applying lessons from the Roosevelt and Eisenhower administrations, the following 
recommendations can be used by the current administration to pass legislation to create 
an NIB: 
 Infrastructure investment should be conveyed as a means to a more robust 
end. Connecting the importance of infrastructure investment to the critical issues 
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of economic growth/competiveness and natural disaster resilience can elevate its 
priority. It is essential to communicate the outcomes of these investments in terms 
that are relatable to the average American household. 
 Identify and educate the key political stakeholders (through presidential 
speeches, letters, press releases, ect.) on how investing in infrastructure will help 
alleviate the issues of greatest concern to them. These issues may be different 
from one group to another (i.e. economy, public health, environment, and 
security) but will build political support. 
 Casting the vision and compromising with Congress, the general public, and 
other stakeholders to come up with the best alternative to achieving this vision 
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